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Rhetoric versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence:
How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Supreme Court rhetoric about the role of contracts and contract law in arbitration
jurisprudence differs sharply from the reality of its applications. In the name of contracts, the
Court administers a self-declared national policy favoring arbitration, a policy directly
benefiting the judicial branch of government. This often puts the Court’s preferences ahead of
those of contracting parties while declaring its mission as solely to enforce contracts in
accordance with contract law. The Court thus cloaks in the rhetoric of volition a policy in
tension with constitutionally-pedigreed access to justice and venerable principles of federalism.
This Article documents the rhetoric-reality gap and explores why it exists and why it
matters. The rhetoric-reality gap is attributable in part to a dilemma the Court created for itself:
its national policy favoring arbitration is constitutionally-suspect unless people assent, yet
letting people make what contracts they wish would prevent implementing the national policy.
The jurisprudence diminishes the Court’s legitimacy, tempts defiance, creates doctrinal
incoherence, and poses other costs.
This Article calls for reconciling these conflicting positions rather than sustaining the
status quo: the Court should either give up its national policy favoring arbitration and truly
respect freedom of contract or come clean about its national policy’s real implications and
acknowledge its narrow conception of contract and contract law. Alas, its most recent work, in
the 2011 AT&T v. Concepcion case, the Court continues to adhere to the rhetoric-reality gap it
has created for itself.
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INTRODUCTION
In contract law, what parties intend is more important than what judges think, no less true
concerning arbitration clauses than any other. Yet many nineteenth century judges disfavored
arbitration, often refusing to enforce clauses agreeing to that means of dispute resolution.1
Congress reversed that hostility in a 1925 statute, now called the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2
It directed judges to enforce arbitration agreements, as they enforce other contracts,3 allowing
that they could be unenforceable on such grounds as any other contract.
That reversal succeeded,4 boosted by dozens of Supreme Court opinions since 1983
expanding the statute‟s sweep.5 After arbitration won legitimacy, with nearly all states adopting
the Uniform Arbitration Act,6 some judges became hostile to litigation7 and many are enamored
of arbitration.8 The truth remains, however, that what judges believe should matter less than what
people intend, since arbitration has long been recognized as a contractual route to private dispute
resolution.9
1

See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAW 22-41 (2d ed. 2010); STEPHEN K. HUBER
& MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALs 1-14 (2d ed. 2006); CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS §1.06 (2d ed. 2006); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to
Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377 (1991); U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006
(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (review); German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 41 N.W. 406 (Neb. 1889) (example); Tobey v.
County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313 (D. Mass. 1845) (classic statement by Justice Story).
2

9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. New York adopted a state arbitration act in 1920, on which the FAA is based. See STONE &
BALES, supra note 1, at 30. The federal statute was originally called the United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883.
3

Actually, the FAA directs specific performance of arbitration agreements, recognizing that money damages would
generally be inadequate to protect aggrieved parties on breach. In contract law, specific performance is an
extraordinary remedy, available only when money would be inadequate to put an aggrieved party in the position
performance would. Given that difference at the foundation of the FAA, it is impossible ever to achieve its ambition
of putting arbitration clauses on an “equal footing” with all other contracts.
4

E.g., Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1977); Berkeley County v. W. Harley
Miller, Inc., 221 S.E.2d 882 (W.V. 1975); Kodak Min. Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984).
5

See Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995:A Sea Change, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996).
6

See STONE & BALES, supra note 1, at 764 (35 states have adopted 1955‟s Uniform Arbitration Act and 14 its
successor, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, quoting the latter).
7

See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme of the
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1139-46 (2006).
8

See Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1993).

9

Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). As Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote during the period just after the FAA was passed:
The question is one of intention, to be ascertained by the same tests that are applied to contracts
generally. Courts are not at liberty to shirk the process of construction under the empire of a belief
that arbitration is beneficent, any more than they may shirk it if their belief happens to be the

2

Reflecting that contractual basis of arbitration, the FAA declares simply that “any written
provision” in any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” to resolve designated
disputes by arbitration is “enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”10 The statute was enacted when commercial actors often reneged on
signed arbitration agreements and targeted that group,11 as well as similar commitments made in
non-commercial arbitration agreements.12 Despite that clarity and context, the Supreme Court
heralds the FAA as stating a sweeping national policy favoring arbitration.13
True, in some older cases, the Court rightly stressed that the FAA‟s primary purpose was
reversing judicial hostility to arbitration14 and enforcing contractual commitments to arbitrate.15
Although some detect continued judicial aversion to arbitration,16 pervasive hostility died
generations ago, yet the Court often speaks as if it were a daily threat to civil society. 17 While
championing this national policy, the Court has insisted that it is only enforcing contracts in
accordance with contract law. Though the Court‟s holdings since the 1980s may sometimes show
greater fidelity to contracts than previously,18 there is a discernable gap between its rhetoric
contrary. No one is under a duty to resort to these conventional tribunals, however helpful their
processes, except to the extent that he has signified his willingness.
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
10

9 U.S.C. § 2.

11

See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (2007).

12

See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional
Rights, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004).
13

E.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 69-72; Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (discussing
how purpose of FAA included streamlining dispute resolution).
14

E.g., Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989).
15

See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985).

16

See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability,
and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469; Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application Of The
Unconscionability Doctrine: How The California Courts Are Circumventing The Federal Arbitration Act, 3
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006); Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California's “Unique” Approach To
Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All The Difference On The Issue Of Preemption Under The
Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61 (2005); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Towards Arbitration and
the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004).
17

See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 83 NYU L. REV. 1420, 1435 (2008) (Supreme Court‟s talk “of combating hostility to arbitration is
today largely anachronistic in that it has come unmoored from the conditions that provided it”).
18

See, e.g., infra note 61 (noting decisions enforcing arbitration contracts despite federal statutory protections
previously seen to require litigation rather than arbitration).
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about that fidelity and what the Court really does. This Article documents that gap and explores
its causes and consequences.
The Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence stimulates intense debate in a vast literature on
many interrelated subjects. Critics object to the lack of judicial attention given to the limits of
arbitration19 while proponents stress its virtues.20 Discourse examines comparative advantages of
the systems by classifying one as public dispute resolution, the other as private.21 Some scholars
applaud the Court‟s emphasis on contracts and contract law in its arbitration jurisprudence22
while others object to applying standard contract law principles, developed for arms‟-length
bargaining, to consumer and employee arbitration clauses.23
Some lament formulaic application of contract law principles and urge instead a
contextual application of them in the arbitration setting.24 Experts debate specific federal
doctrines in arbitration jurisprudence as related to contract law.25 They moot the role of freedom
of contract and assent in choosing forums for dispute resolution.26 The contending positions
19

E.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1 (2004);
Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81 (1992); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairness in
Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional Mandate?, 26 PACE L. REV. 73 (2005); Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R.
Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s
Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and
Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 75 (2004); David
S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1247 (2010).
20

E.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004); Stephen J. Ware, The
Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and
Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006).
21

See Michael E. Solimine, Forum Selection Clauses and the Privitization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT‟L L. J. 51
(1992).
22

E.g., Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor’s Associates, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1001 (1996).
23

E.g., Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium, supra note 19; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 675677 (1996).
24

E.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEV. L. J. 37, 47-57 (2008)
(notably also concentrating on the context of consumer contracts, not contracts generally).
25

E.g., Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Simple
Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT‟L ARB. 1, 29, 32, 34 (2003) [hereinafter Rau, Seventeen Propositions]; Stephen J.
Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, 8 NEV. L. J. 107 (2007) [hereinafter
Ware, Separability Doctrine].
26

See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993); Richard Speidel, Contract Theory
and Securities Arbitration: Wither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
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produce some common ground.27 Yet enduring sources of disagreement include differences
between the theoretical appeal of arbitration compared to litigation and the practice in fact.28
Scholars continue to debate the FAA‟s constitutionality,29 the Supreme Court‟s fidelity to
legislative history,30 and federalism aspects of both31 (also a subject on which the Justices
disagree, often sharply32).
This Article contributes a different review and criticism by addressing the rhetoric-reality
gap: the difference between the Court‟s incantations about arbitration as contract, and purported
application of contract law, versus the reality that its jurisprudence imposes on private parties,
impinges on both freedom of contract and freedom from contract, intrudes upon state contract
law, and changes and distorts actual contract law doctrine.33 This review is agnostic about
whether arbitration or litigation is superior, systemically or in particular contexts. Nor does it
join debate over applying contract law principles formulaically or applying principles suitable in
business settings to non-business settings. It assumes that people should be free to choose, as the

Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbital Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1381 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83
(1996); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist Reply to
Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998).
27

EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006).

28

STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET AL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 214
(5th ed. 2007).
29

See David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress Over State Courts, 83 OREGON L.
REV. 541 (2004).
30

E.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT §10.53 (1994) (calling it a “pillar
of sand”); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration
Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST.. L. REV. 99 (2006); Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the
Presumption of Arbitrability, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 279, 328 (1992) (“The Supreme Court has no clear expression of
congressional policy upon which to base its own program of promoting commercial arbitration.”); Henry C.
Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 389 (1992).
31

See Pierre H. Bergeron, At the Crossroads of Federalism and Arbitration: The Application of Prima Paint to
Purportedly Void Contracts, 93 KY. L. J. 423 (2005); Edward Brunet.,The Minimal Role of Federalism and State
Law in Arbitration, 8 NEV. L. J. 326 (2007); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the
Demise of Separability, 56 SMU L. REV. 819 (2003); Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act
by Reining in Judicial Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L. J. 385 (2007).
32

For example, though many opinions and Justices have forged headlong into federal preemption of state law in this
field, Justice Thomas, devotee of federalism, steadfastly dissents from preemption; Justice Scalia often echoes the
objection but has retreated somewhat; Justice O‟Connor once steadfastly opposed preemption but eventually
relented. Chief Justice Rehnquist steered colleagues toward federalism. See infra text accompanying notes 188-202.
33

Professor David Horton also has detected fundamental problems with the contractual basis of much of prevailing
federal arbitration jurisprudence as well. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 665-66 (2010) (showing how assertions that unilateral amendments to
arbitration clauses are valid under Court‟s federal arbitration jurisprudence are invalid under basic contract law).
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rhetoric advertises, with courts faithfully applying contract law principles to evaluate choice, not
putting a thumb on the scale favoring arbitration while feigning contractual neutrality.
Part I of this Article documents the rhetoric-reality gap through a detailed descriptive and
critical account of a dozen leading Supreme Court cases. The Court‟s oft-repeated rhetorical
statements include: “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion;”34 contract interpretation is a
matter of state contract law;35 the FAA‟s purpose is to make arbitration clauses enforceable
according to their terms;36 arbitration procedures can be freely designed because arbitration is a
consensual matter;37 and the purpose of contractual interpretation of arbitration clauses is always
“to give effect to the intent of the parties.”38
Despite all that, the Court‟s applications include: presuming parties intend arbitration
when expressions are ambiguous;39 diminishing party autonomy to choose law other than the
FAA;40 ignoring party contemplations about the scope of private bargains in favor of federal
declarations;41 insisting that arbitration clauses be severed from contracts challenged as invalid
and then enforced, without regard to party intent;42 limiting freedom from contract by liberally
allowing strangers to enforce contracts;43 and limiting freedom of contract by refusing to let
parties specify the scope of power their chosen arbitrators possess.44
34

Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989).
35

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).

36

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57, 58, (1995); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
37

Volt, 489 U.S. 468, 479; First Options, 414 U.S. 938, 944; EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289
(2002).
38

Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).

39

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 69-76.
40

Compare Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468
(1989), discussed infra text accompanying notes 77-78, with Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514
U.S. 52 (1995), discussed infra text accompanying notes 79-89.
41

Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), discussed infra text accompanying notes
90-95.
42

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), discussed infra text accompanying notes
114-117; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), discussed infra text accompanying notes
118-121; Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), discussed infra text accompanying notes
122-125.
43

Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009), discussed infra text accompanying notes 142-147.

44

Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), discussed infra text accompanying notes 148150.
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Part II tries to explain the gap, finding doctrinal explanations least satisfactory, legalistic
explanations most robust, and institutional factors playing a supplementary role. Exploration of
doctrinal explanations supposes alternative portrayals of what the Article presents as a rhetoricreality gap. For example, gaps between what courts say and do may be pervasive, particularly in
contract law, where stern exhortations of principle are accompanied by contrary results, making
the Court‟s kindred style normal not anomalous.45 Alternatively, the Court‟s arbitration
jurisprudence could be explained as a matter of modern contractual default rule theory, where the
Court simply has set rules that apply unless parties agree otherwise.46
Though these doctrinal explanations slightly narrow or redefine the gap between the
Court‟s rhetoric and the reality, they are incomplete and unsatisfactory. The rhetoric-reality gap
in the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence differs qualitatively and quantitatively from that found in
general contract law and elsewhere; rationalizing all the Court‟s opinions in terms of default rule
theory requires a conception of default rules that is so expansive, and so immersed in tensions
between freedom of contract and national policy, as simply to reframe the rhetoric-reality gap.
Rather, in doctrinal terms, the gap is best appreciated as rhetoric from venerable 19th century
classical contract theory yoked to a caricature of late 20th century post-realist contract law that
includes a substantial mandatory element. The latter is what Grant Gilmore called “contorts,”
something more familiar in tort law than in classical contract law. The question remains why.
Exploration turns to legalistic accounts, which are found to be considerably more robust.
These attribute the Court‟s rhetoric-reality gap to tension between citizen access to courts and
states‟ rights on the one hand and the Court‟s national policy favoring arbitration on the other:
rhetoric about contract and contract law pays lip service to citizens‟ and states‟ rights while the
national policy requires departures from both in reality. In other words, a national policy
favoring arbitration over litigation and federal law over state law is constitutionally-suspect
unless based on voluntary assent of people, meaning a basis in contract; but contracts that choose
state law or channel disputes into litigation instead of arbitration are incongruent with that
policy, and disfavored. The rhetoric of contracts is a device to portray the national policy as
legitimate even while departures from the rhetoric in practice are necessary to implement it.
The perceived national policy, in turn, arises from institutional factors. This includes a
strong dose of judicial parochialism that prefers to push disputes away from the courthouse. This
perspective differs from some common beliefs about judicial appetites, warranting a preliminary
explanation.47 In earlier history, when judges wanted the business of litigation brought to their
courthouses, it was easy to understand judicial hostility to arbitration, simply on anti-competition
grounds. Today, and for several decades, there is no shortage of legal disputes to go around, and
many judges, perhaps especially federal judges and Supreme Court justices, would prefer to

45

See infra text accompanying notes 154-161.

46

See infra text accompanying notes 162-170.

47

See infra text accompanying notes 185-187.
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reduce court dockets, not jealously hoard them.48 Even if it were true that some courts, perhaps
especially state courts, still seek to maximize caseloads, the Supreme Court‟s efforts to curtail
that appetite is equally parochial. Either way, it is a fight among judges about how to direct
resolution of legal disputes, between courts and arbitrators, not about contracts and contract law.
That helps to explain the rhetoric-reality gap.49
The Article also considers but discounts the role of ideology of the Justices in explaining
the rhetoric-reality gap. All the Justices exhibit the gap, though ideology influences its exact
shape.50 It tends to be narrowest when Justices care more about contract law and state law than
when they embrace federal power and law in arbitration jurisprudence.51 The Justices do trade
barbs along ideological lines in arbitration cases producing multiple opinions. Liberal Justices
dissenting call out conservative-majority writers for favoring big business against consumers and
employees or vice versa.52 But neither side as a group does any better job than the other in
handling contract law; all demonstrate the propensity to exuberantly proclaim freedom of
contract in rhetoric while impinging on it in application.
The Article ultimately explores why the rhetoric-reality gap matters. The gap imposes
costs in terms of the Court‟s legitimacy and doctrinal coherence—and gives contract law a bad
name. In a conclusion, the piece notes my inspiration for writing it, which comes as a teacher of
Contracts (and related transactional subjects such as Corporations) rather than as a scholar of
Arbitration. Widespread talk in the arbitration cases and literature makes it look as if a teacher of
Contracts should know more and teach more about arbitration than I knew before writing this or
have ever shared with my Contracts students in twenty years of teaching. But on closer
inspection that appearance turns out to be misleading and the conclusion false. Arbitration law
today does not warrant significant treatment in Contracts classes. The Court‟s arbitration
jurisprudence flaunts contract rhetoric but its applications flunk the Contracts course.
I. DOCUMENTING THE RHETORIC/REALITY GAP
It is well-known that the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of the early 20th century FAA in
pivotal cases from the late 20th century rendered virtually all arbitration agreements in most
contracts governed by federal law.53 In 1967‟s Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,54
48

See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP.
CT. REV. 1 (1993).
49

This institutional account also includes a moderate dose of simple Court indifference to the prosaic subject of
contract law.
50

See infra text accompanying notes 188-202.

51

See infra text accompanying notes 106-112 (comparing Justice Thomas‟s concurring opinion with the majority
opinion in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002)).
52

A good example is Justice Ginsburg dissenting from an opinion written by Justice Alito in Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v.
Animal Feeds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)).
53

Earlier Court opinions addressing the FAA took a narrower view of the statute‟s purposes, a literal approach to its
language, and limited its scope to procedural aspects of federal jurisdiction. See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 644-
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the Court held that Congress enacted the FAA by reference not to its relatively narrow Article III
authority over federal courts but its plenary power to regulate interstate commerce.55 The result
of that momentous opinion, by Justice Fortas, is that the statute applies not only in federal courts
exercising federal question jurisdiction, but to federal courts in diversity cases applying state
law. In 1984‟s Southland Corp v Keating,56 the Court found that the FAA was a substantive
statute establishing federal law, also applicable in state courts,57 and preempts any state law that
obstructs the FAA‟s objectives,58 which the Court said announced “a national policy favoring
arbitration.”59 That policy discovery paved the way for huge expansion of federal authority over
arbitration law into state territory60 and throughout federal law.61 The comprehensive scope of
653 (reviewing and so classifying Supreme Court FAA cases from 1925 to 1966). For an account of the
justifications for the later position, see Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting out of
Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (1994).
54

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Substantive aspects of Prima Paint are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 114-117.
55

Justice Black wrote a scathing dissent that continues to attract devotees.

56

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).

57

This amounted to a functional overruling of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), cited
supra note 9, which viewed the FAA as procedural, not substantive.
58

Southland, 465 U.S. at ___. In Southland, franchisees filed a class action lawsuit against a franchisor asserting
various theories, including violations of state franchise statutes. The company invoked an arbitration clause in each
of the contracts. California courts debated whether arbitration applied to the statutory violation claim because a
related state statute rendered invalid any contract term that might waive statutory protections of franchisees. The
Supreme Court declared that the FAA applied and preempted the California law because it “undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.” Id.
59

The Court began making such bold statements in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. 1 (1983), discussed
infra text accompanying notes 69-72, and has exuberantly repeated them for decades. Only two limitations appear:
the contract must be within the statute‟s scope, principally involving commerce, and an agreement to arbitrate is
subject to any grounds in law or equity as would invalidate any contract. The Court wrote: this “broad principle of
enforceability” of agreements to arbitrate should not be “subject to any additional limitations under state law.”
Southland, 465 U.S. at ___. The Court claimed to find support for its sweeping expansion in the legislative history
of the FAA, but scholars challenge its accuracy. See MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 30,
§10.53 (calling it a “pillar of sand”). Justice O‟Connor dissented, objecting to federalizing this field of law. She
stressed that the FAA and kindred state statutes had long been understood by contracts law scholars as procedural,
not substantive, leaving contract law intact. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 27, at n. 13 (O‟Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing 6 S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 368 (rev. ed. 1938)). Though O‟Connor
ultimately capitulated to the Court‟s persistence, citing stare decisis, Allied-Bruce, discussed infra, the results
continue to be debated. Compare Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331 (opining that Southland was fundamentally erroneous and has caused extensive damage to arbitration law
and practice) with Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002).
60

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).

61

The so-called national policy enabled the Court to expand the scope of arbitration to include an infinite variety of
claims, including those arising under federal statutes that prior rulings had insulated. E.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust claims under the Sherman Act); Shearson American
Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (given national policy favoring arbitration agreements, claims under
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federal law was sealed in 1995‟s Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v Dobson,62 when the Court
construed the FAA‟s “involving commerce” language63 to have the broadest reach within
Congress‟s Commerce Clause power.64 It even includes a homeowner service contract to have
termite infestation eradicated from a home.65
Less appreciated is how the Court‟s jurisprudence since 1983 increasingly eclipses the
role of contracts and contract law with a radically different body of law, though the Court insists
it is simply enforcing contracts and applying contract law.66 Throughout the Court‟s arbitration
jurisprudence in those years, its rhetoric about fidelity to contract has escalated while its
faithfulness to contract and contract law has proportionally declined. Often that gap is vast,
though sometimes it appears to be a simple misunderstanding of contract law. 67 The Court
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act can be arbitrated,
distinguishing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson American Exp., Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989) (“agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 is enforceable and resolution of the
claims only in a judicial forum is not required”, overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (statutory claims generally). The Court also expanded the FAA‟s
scope by holding that arbitration of state claims pendent to concurrent litigation must be compelled too, though it
results in bifurcation of disputes and increased costs. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
62

Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). Substantive aspects of Allied-Bruce are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 90-95.
63

See supra text accompanying note 10.

64

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Strickland, supra note 30 (problems with federal judicial
expansion of arbitration law and urging Congress to intervene to restore some authority to the states).
65

Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265. Some modest statutory exceptions put contracts outside the FAA‟s scope:
(1) a miniscule population of purely local matters, e.g., Arkansas Diagnostic Center v. Tahiri, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 345,
at 14-15 (Ark. 2007); (2) a narrow class of employment agreements exempted by the statute, e.g., Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (construing FAA exemption concerning employment contracts narrowly,
as solely applicable to transportation workers); (3) insurance contracts under a different federal statute making all
insurance law the province of the states, McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq.; and (4) collective
bargaining agreements subject to a different federal statute and a parallel set of issues about arbitration, National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.; see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
United Paperworkers Int‟l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (FAA does not apply to labor
employment contracts); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (asserting that the same national policy
applies to arbitration agreements in the context of collective bargaining agreements not subject to the FAA but to
federal labor statutes). This Article‟s scope is confined to contracts deemed to be within the FAA.
66

See Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability, supra note 22, at 1006 (“While the substance of the Court's
arbitration decisions over the last twenty years has been remarkably faithful to the contractual approach, the Court's
rhetoric has been even more supportive of the principle that arbitration law is a part of contract law.”) As the
following discussion documents, in the fourteen years since Professor Ware wrote that, the gap has widened, with
incremental curtailment of fidelity to contract and increased assertions of contract rhetoric.
67

A good example appears in Justice Scalia‟s dissent in Allied-Bruce, protesting federalization but appreciating
stare decisis. Scalia suggested that for parties who had relied on Southland, which he considered erroneous,
“rescission of the contract for mistake of law would often be available.” Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. ___ (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 616 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152). The authorities
Scalia cited for this proposition do not support the assertion—nor would others. Contract law allows rescission
based on mutual mistake of a material fact that is a basic assumption of a contract. It is not obvious that a binding
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occasionally acknowledges that it is not relying on state contract law, but the FAA, yet still
declares or implies that the federal law it is creating is some species of contract law. But, as the
following documents, that species is so alien to actual contract law as to defy the recurring
assurances that arbitration is fundamentally about contracts or contract law. This discussion
treats a dozen leading Court cases, a tour of the terrain, organized topically but tending also to
follow a chronological pattern in which one can see the rhetoric-reality gap widening over time.
A. Interpretive Presumptions and Limited Choice of Law
Contract law‟s tools to address ambiguity channel analysis into recognized and capacious
categories, useful to determine such recurring matters as whether to admit extrinsic evidence to
aid interpretation or whether parties manifested sufficiently definite intention to form a binding
contract. Contract law does not take a stance on whether to treat ambiguous language to channel
performance in any particular direction—though the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence rushes it
headlong into that territory.68
In 1983, in an opinion that launched the Supreme Court on a trajectory, the Court
invented a presumption favoring arbitration. Despite declaring that arbitration is contractual,
Justice Brennan in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital69 asserted that the FAA “requires a liberal
reading of arbitration agreements” and “is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state . . . policies to the contrary.”70 The
FAA “establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”71
Though such assertions do not exist in the common law of contracts,72 there are doctrinal
grounds that could justify them. Among methods of interpretation elaborated in Arthur Corbin‟s
precedent of the Supreme Court, later overruled, qualifies. An old-fashioned view even held that mistakes about law
are not grounds to rescind a contract. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 679, § 9.2 (2d ed. 1990) (“Some
courts have denied relief [in mistake of law cases but] the modern view is that the existing law is part of the state of
facts at the time of agreement. Therefore, most courts will grant relief for such a mistake, as they would for any
other mistake of fact.”) But what‟s wrong with Justice Scalia‟s statement is not about the difference between a
mistake of law or fact. It is about the state of the law existing at the time of contract formation. At that time, the
parties did not mistakenly apprehend the state of the law. Under Scalia‟s model, they were not mistaken at all. The
Court was mistaken.
68

In addition to the cases discussed in this Section exhibiting this feature, concerning the Court‟s national policy
favoring arbitration, the Court has created special interpretive tools to address the meaning of the word
“arbitration,” discussed infra text accompanying notes 128-140 (discussing Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds, 130
S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
69

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).

70

Id., at 24 (quoted in, e.g., Howsam 537 U.S. 79).

71

Moses Cone, at 460 U.S. 25 (quoted in, e.g., Stolt-Neilsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758; First Options, 514 U.S. 938;
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52).
72

See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 704-05 (noting how foreign these ideas are to contract law).
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definitive treatise, for example, they could be classified as a construction of the contract in the
public interest—stressing congruence not with particular intentions of specific parties but general
judicial notions of public policy.73 More generously, the Court might be seen as establishing a
default rule to deal with ambiguity, at least in the sense that parties can avoid the result by
avoiding ambiguity.74 But the Court did not provide any such analysis. Indeed, neither the Moses
Cone Court‟s rhetoric about contracts nor its presumption was relevant to the issue the Court
faced.75 Even so, the dicta influenced the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence simultaneously to
declare freedom of contract while imposing a national policy favoring arbitration.76
For a few years, it remained possible for parties to opt out of the FAA and choose the law
of a particular state, as suggested by 1989‟s Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v Stanford
University.77 It addressed a construction contract naming California the applicable law. A statute
let courts stay arbitration pending litigation among third parties that could risk inconsistent
rulings on like facts. Amid a payment dispute, the contractor wanted to arbitrate and the owner to
litigate against the contractor and others not party to the arbitration agreement. In a rare and
never-repeated show of restraint, the Supreme Court agreed with all California courts ruling for
the owner. Federal policy favors arbitration and requires interpreting contracts accordingly, but
there is no policy or rule about particular arbitration procedures. 78 For the same reasons, state
law was not preempted, Chief Justice Rehnquist‟s opinion concluded.
Volt‟s respect for contract and choice of law was short-lived, however, truncated in a
nearly-identical case six years later, Mastrobuono v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.79 A securities
brokerage contract on a standard form chose New York law and directed arbitration under
industry rules. After customers won an arbitration award of punitive damages, the broker wanted
it vacated because New York law said arbitrators lack authority to award punitive damages.80
The Court refused, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, saying the contract did not manifest
73

See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 550.

74

See Rau, Seventeen Propositions, supra note at 25, at 29, 32, 34 (developing a defense of some of the important
elements of the Court‟s federal arbitration jurisprudence based on contract law default rule theory); see also infra
text accompanying notes 96-109 (noting Justice Breyer‟s attempts to defend some of the Court‟s jurisprudence using
contract law default rule theory).
75

The issues concerned the finality and appeal-ability of judgments.

76

See Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 23, at 660-61 & 674.

77

Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).

78

Volt, 489 U.S. ___ (“[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the
federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”).
That stance from 1989 was radically altered over the next two decades, clearly manifest in Stolt-Neilsen, where the
Court favored a particular type of arbitration and eschewed relevant state contract law. See infra text accompanying
notes 128-140.
79

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).

80

Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
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intention to include New York‟s law limiting arbitrators‟ power to award punitive damages. It
perceived a conflict between the choice of New York law, so limiting arbitrator power, and the
securities arbitrator‟s rules allowing punitive awards. In fact, there was no conflict. The choice of
New York law could easily mean no punitive damages could be awarded in arbitrations that the
contract said would be used to resolve disputes. That was the brokerage firm‟s simple and
compelling argument, which would be deferential to New York law and faithful to the contract.
Though stating that arbitration is a matter of contract and contract law, the Court instead
chose a convoluted approach that first created ambiguities in the contract and then applied
federal arbitration jurisprudence, along with a modicum of state contract law, to resolve them.
Standard contract law principles81 and conflict of laws rules82 hold that a choice of law
incorporates into a contract the law of the named jurisdiction—including rules barring arbitrators
from awarding punitive damages. But the Court decided it could mean less than that. It could cut
some rules from its scope, including arcane rules like a state law denying arbitrators power to
award punitive damages. Presto: the contract contained an ambiguity.83
To resolve it, the Court used three principles. The first was a fair rendering of contract
law, construing ambiguities against the drafter, the brokerage. 84 The second was a strained
rendering of another contract law principle, to harmonize all terms of a contract, which the Court
thought required denying effect to part of New York law to uphold a broader scope of arbitration
clause. But the opposite reading is equally consistent with that principle. The Court‟s third, and
most striking ground, was the expanding federal arbitration law hatched in Moses Cone:
“ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause [are] resolved in favor of arbitration.”85 The
upshot is to require crystal clarity on terms restricting arbitration power, even in a standard form
adhesion contract.86 The common law requires no such clarity87 and it is a stretch to contend that
81

See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 15.11 (Richard A Lord ed., 4th ed. 2007)
[hereinafter WILLISTON, CONTRACTS].
82

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §§ 186, comment b; 187(1), 187(3), comments b, c, h; 205 and comments
and Reporter's Note; 207.
83

In dicta, the Court suggested that if the contract were silent about punitive damages, silence would manifest no
intention to bar them and they would be allowed because the FAA would preempt New York‟s law barring them.
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S ___. Why is not clear. The Court assumed that a state law limiting remedies available in
arbitration was anti-arbitration, unsurprising given the Court‟s enthusiasm for expansive readings of the FAA. But it
is not obviously anti-arbitration. Punitive damages are allowed in tort actions but not for breach of contract and there
are considerable differences between procedural and substantive rules of law on the one hand and the law of
remedies on the other.
84

For the two contract law principles, the Court rightly drew upon state law (in New York, whose law the contract
said applied, as well as Illinois, where the contract was formed), along with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
85

Mastrobuono, 514 U.S ___ (citing Moses Cone, discussed supra text accompanying notes 69-72). That was a
strange holding, since the issue was not whether to arbitrate but what remedies an arbitrator might award.
86

See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, supra note 81, at § 15.11 (“while the Court has continued to hew to the freedom of
contract model, at least paying lip service to the notion that it will enforce the parties‟ agreement to arbitrate in
accordance with the parties‟ wishes, it insisted to a far greater degree than previously that those wishes be made
clear.”)
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the Court‟s interpretive gymnastics are merely supplying a default rule that parties can readily
reverse at will. Worse, a basic principle of contract law is to interpret similar contracts similarly,
yet Mastrobuono does not square with Volt.88 Mastrobuono silently overruled Volt and respect
for states, contracts, and contract law, putting the Court‟s national policy favoring arbitration
ahead of the country‟s longer-standing tradition favoring freedom of contract.89
The Court‟s 1995 Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v Dobson90 opinion completed the
diminution of party choice of applicable law—despite Court rhetoric stressing freedom of
contract. Justice Breyer‟s opinion addressed the FAA‟s scope,91 capturing contracts that
“evidence a transaction involving [interstate] commerce.”92 Lower courts had split on whether to
read this as a directive from Congress about the population of contracts within its reach or a
reference to intentions of parties about the scope of the deals they make. The case concerned a
contract between a homeowner and a termite-protection provider. The Alabama Supreme Court
denied that the FAA applied, considering the local nature of the contract, and lack of any
indication that the parties contemplated the transaction involving interstate commerce.93
87

The Court years earlier accurately applied contract law when it enforced another standard-form forum selection
clause. In standard form contracts, such clauses usually are not assented to, but contract law sees them as
enforceable so long as they are reasonable. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §211 (1981). In Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1990), the Court noted that a choice of forum clause in a cruise ship ticket is not likely
to be negotiated or represent true assent of a passenger, but that only means the clause is tested for reasonableness
and the clause in question passed that test. Id. at 593-94. Mastrobuono acted as if there was assent to the standard
form securities brokerage contract and probed to determine exactly what was assented to by a choice of law clause.
88

The contracts were analytically identical (choosing state law that contained a twist on arbitration practice) but got
different treatment. Justice Thomas made that point in his dissent. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S ___ (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens acknowledged it, distinguishing the cases procedurally, not substantively: the Court in
Volt deferred to California‟s interpretation of the contract and state law whereas the Court in Mastrobuono was
reviewing federal court interpretations of the contract. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S ___. Yet another way to distinguish
Volt and Mastrobuono is to stress how in Mastrobuono the parties chose NASD arbitration rules, those rules
permitted punitive awards, and an NASD arbitrators‟ manual told arbitrators they were authorized to award punitive
damages.
89

See Alan Scott Rau, Does State Arbitration Law Matter at All? Federal Preemption, in ADR AND THE LAW 199,
207 (15th ed. 1999) (“Volt has become peripheral” and the enforceability of party choice of state law at odds with
federal mandates “has been steadily eroding and is being increasingly ignored”). It‟s possible to claim that an
unadorned choice of a state law (say New York or California) selects that state over other states, rather than that
state over any federal law, since federal and state law are both sovereign in each state. See Ware, Punitive Damages
in Arbitration, supra note 53. Though that view contributes a modest defense of part of the Mastrobuno opinion, it
does not reconcile it with Volt. Further, at least in today‟s arbitration-rich world, that reading is less obvious.
Contracts today often expressly choose to be governed by both the Federal Arbitration Act, concerning arbitration,
and by particular state law, concerning other matters. Parties are aware that arbitration law differs under the various
regimes and people may wish to choose which applies, state or federal, but the Court‟s jurisprudence does not
facilitate such choice.
90

513 U.S. 265 (1995).

91

See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.

92

9 U.S.C. § 2.

93

As a result, Alabama law applied, which then barred arbitration.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, deciding that “contemplation of the parties” is not the
test of whether the FAA applies. It instead stated a test solely based on its declarations about
what interstate commerce is. It took this position by reaffirming Southland‟s preemption a
decade earlier and despite 20 state attorneys general filing amicus briefs to overrule it. The Court
invoked stare decisis and the statute‟s recently-discovered national policy favoring arbitration.
But the ruling gets contract law backwards. Contract law is all about contemplation of parties.
Aside from narrow technical corners such as the statute of frauds, 94 contract law is not about
statutory directives channeling agreements into baskets for legislatively-ordained treatment or
courts setting default rules that parties are not allowed to change.95 Despite stern proclamations
that its arbitration jurisprudence is all about contracts and contract law, the Court curtails private
autonomy to opt out of the Court‟s national policy in favor of state law.
B. Clarity of Intention
Even in the rare cases when the Court tries to imagine what actual contracting parties
intended, or would have intended had they thought about an issue, its national policy retains a
strong presence. The result is jurisprudence ringing of classical contract law rhetoric while
working it into forms making contract law a tool of social control. For example, in 1995‟s First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,96 an agreement between a company and a securities firm
contained an arbitration clause. A dispute arose between individuals who had not signed the
agreement who wished to litigate and that firm which wanted to arbitrate. At issue was whether a
court or arbitrator decides if the arbitration clause governs. Reciting standard rhetoric, the Court
said that “turns upon what the parties agreed about the matter,”97 usually by applying “ordinary
state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”98 Having recited the rhetoric, the
Court retreated with an “important qualification:” courts cannot assume parties agreed to
arbitrate such questions absent “clear and unmistakable” evidence of that intention.99
That creates a special rule of federal arbitration jurisprudence alien to contract law: amid
ambiguity about who decides whether an arbitration clause governs, doubts are resolved in favor
94

Even such technical statutory directives are subject to considerable ameliorating doctrines, such as part
performance. See infra note 162.
95

The importance of the contemplation of the parties was stressed in a 1961 concurring opinion of Chief Judge
Lumbard in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Const. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961). He explained how
such a test is necessary to implement Congressional intent without forfeiting state contract law to a new federal
arbitration jurisprudence. The Court in 1995‟s Allied-Bruce said that concern was moot, after the Court for several
decades had abandoned federalism in its arbitration jurisprudence. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at ___.
96

514 U.S. 938 (1995).

97

First Options, 514 U.S. at ___.

98

Id.

99

Id. (quoting a case from the context of labor arbitration, AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (refusing to compel arbitration of labor dispute though possibly within scope of
collective bargaining agreement)).
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of courts. That special rule differs from the Court‟s special rule of arbitration interpretation,
invented in Moses Cone and extended in Mastrobuono, resolving ambiguities in the scope of a
clause to favor arbitration. Justice Breyer distinguished the cases using hypothetical bargain
analysis popular among contract law theorists.100 He supposes that parties to agreements with
arbitration clauses “likely gave at least some thought to the scope of arbitration” so that, given a
national policy favoring arbitration, the Court demands clarity to show parties did not intend
arbitration—as in Moses Cone and Mastrobuono.101 In contrast, “who decides” is “rather arcane”
and “a party often might not focus upon that question.”102 After reverting to contract rhetoric—
under “the principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it has specifically
agreed to submit to arbitration”103—the Court insisted on “clear and unmistakable” evidence of
that intent, inventing a standard alien to contract law and of such limited use in law generally as
to bewilder rather than enlighten.104
Despite the attempt at using contract theory‟s hypothetical bargain analysis, its use
underscores weaknesses in the Court‟s jurisprudence not strengths in Breyer‟s engagement. The
analysis supposes that people forming contracts with arbitration clauses make degrees of
calculation about matters closely related. The Court does not justify its belief that there are
significant differences between whether an issue will be resolved by arbitration and whether a
court or arbitrator decides fights over that. Both are arcane. Parties often will give neither the
slightest thought. Those giving thought to one can as likely be supposed to give thought to the
other. The First Options Court‟s analysis also departed from contract law when applying its new
test to the facts. In deciding that the reluctant parties had not “clearly and unmistakably” vested
the arbitrator with decision-making power, the Court concentrated not on the terms of the
agreement, but on post-contractual conduct.105
The Court saw the obverse of First Options, finding requisite “clear and unmistakable”
intent, in 2002‟s Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.106 A dispute under a brokerage contract
requiring arbitration posed a threshold issue of whether an arbitrator or court should decide if,
under industry arbitration rules, a time limitation for bringing claims applied or had run. As
usual, the Court recited rhetoric (“arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
100

E.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1815 (1991).
101

First Options, 514 U.S. at ___.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

The phrase “clear and unmistakable” is not used in law generally. It is an invention of the Supreme Court that it
has used with some regularity in the context of addressing waivers in the labor union context and in ascertaining
Congressional intent. A December 2010 Westlaw search for the phrase in Supreme Court opinions returned a mere
66 instances, the vast majority using the phrase colloquially rather than as an operative legal standard.
105

Id.

106

537 U.S. 79 (2002).
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required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit”)107 then
added qualifications (there is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”108 with a
heightened clarity standard about the “who decides” issue109). The Court elaborated its
hypothetical bargain analysis from First Options, this time finding clear and unmistakable intent
bound up in the contract‟s structure and language. In this exercise, however, the Court draws
inferences less about what parties would want under the common law of contracts, than what
they would want, given the Court‟s FAA jurisprudence—while making it no clearer what the
imported and rarely-used concept of “clear and unmistakable” means.110
Again, the hypothetical bargain analysis is a nice touch, but proves more rhetorical than
real, indicated by Justice Thomas‟s concurring opinion in Howsam. He stressed that “arbitration
is a matter of contract”—and he really means it. As Volt held, under the FAA, courts must
enforce agreements to arbitrate just as they would what Thomas called “ordinary contracts”—in
“accordance with their terms.”111 Volt directs courts to choice of law clauses in agreements
containing arbitration clauses and to enforce them. The Howsam contract chose New York law,
whose highest court construed a nearly-identical agreement to mean that the decision was for an
arbitrator, not a court.112 Thomas is thus clear: state contract law governs, not federal arbitration
jurisprudence. On inspection, therefore, the Court‟s Howsam opinion emerges as
characteristically opaque: expressing fealty to contract law while advancing arbitration
jurisprudence expressing a national policy favoring arbitration over freedom of contract.
C. Federal Severing of Private Contracts
The common law of contracts takes a contextual approach to determining the effects of
the invalidity of one clause on the rest of a contract.113 The Court‟s federal arbitration
jurisprudence imposes a severability rule, so that the existence of an arbitration clause—even in
a fraudulent, illegal or unconscionable bargain—makes disputes over the bargain‟s validity for
arbitration, not court. The Court minted this tool in 1967‟s Prima Paint,114 when a business
107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

See Joseph L. Franco, Comment, Casually Finding the Clear and Unmistakable: A Re-Evaluation of First
Options in Light of Recent Lower Court Decisions, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 443 (2006); Mark A. Mulchek,
Note, Arbitration by Accident: Unintentionally Meeting the Clear and Unmistakable Evidence Standard, 2007 J.
DISP. RESOL. 597 (2007).
111

Howsam, 537 U.S. ___ (Thomas, J., dissenting).

112

Id. (citing Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1997)).

113

See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 67, at §§ 5.7-5-9; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §184; Mark
Movsasian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 42, 46-48 (1995).
114

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), mentioned supra text accompanying notes
54-55.
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buyer sued its seller to rescind a contract based on fraud and the seller invoked the contract‟s
arbitration clause. The seller won because the Court made a stunning move: it severed the
arbitration clause from the rest of the contract. The Court observed that the buyer challenged the
contract as a whole as fraudulently induced, but not the arbitration clause. So the arbitration
clause stood and the Court directed the fraud claim to arbitration.115 Nothing in the contract
authorized the Court to do so and the common law of contracts warrants the opposite.116
Despite controversy,117 the Court embraces its severability invention, as in 2006‟s replay
of Prima Paint, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.118A borrower objected to usurious
terms as illegal under Florida law and the lender invoked an arbitration clause. The Florida
Supreme Court held the entire contract void, including its arbitration clause. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed, citing Prima Paint’s federal procedure to sever the arbitration clause from the
rest of the contract. Justice Scalia also announced: “The issue of the contract‟s validity is
different from the issue whether any agreement . . . was ever concluded,”119 saying courts can
decide questions about contract formation, such as whether a party had contractual capacity. But
nothing in contract law makes any such distinction to disempower courts to decide the legality of
a contract. Buckeye thus sustains an invention of uncertain congruity with contract law,120 and of
115

The basis for this invention of federal arbitration jurisprudence, which is not based on state contract law, was the
FAA. Section 4 outlines procedures to compel arbitration and stay litigation: when the court, after a hearing, is
“satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.” When
reviewing an application to stay under FAA Section 3, the Court found that Section 3 limits the court‟s consideration
to issues “relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.” 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4.
116

E.g., Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996) (fraud in inducement of contract renders invalid an arbitration
clause contained in it). Before Prima Paint, most federal and state courts addressing the issue had taken the opposite
approach to what Prima Paint did, though an influential federal circuit court applied the severability rule a decade
earlier. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). See infra
text accompanying notes 216-224.
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See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, Prima Paint Pushed Compulsory Arbitration Under the Erie Train, 2 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2007); Richard L. Barnes, Buckeye, Bull’s-Eye, or Moving Target: The FAA, Compulsory
Arbitration, and Common-Law Contract, 31 VERMONT L. REV. 141 (2006); Richard C. Reuben, First Options,
Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability, 56 SMU L. REV. 819 (2003); Ware, Separability Doctrine,
supra note 31. For a resounding defense of the severability doctrine, based in part on the policies favoring
arbitration, but mostly on earnest attempts to anchor it in traditional contract law doctrine, see also Rau, Seventeen
Propositions, supra note 25.
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Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
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Buckeye, 546 U.S. ___.
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Scholars and lower court judges vigorously debate whether there are meaningful differences between contracts
that are void or voidable or between contracts that existed but are later excused and those that never existed in the
first place. For example, Professors Ware and Rau have engaged in long-running debate on the severability rule and
how to distinguish between doctrines rendering a contract a nullity from the outset and therefore a question for
courts and those excusing a contractual duty and therefore a question for arbitrators. See Ware, Separability
Doctrine, supra note25; see also Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7 th Cir. 2001)
(Judge Frank Easterbrook‟s attempt to explain the difference, believing that a contract induced by fraud is still a
contract assented to whereas a contract signed by forgery or by an agent lacking authority is not assented to). The
debate about whether there are differences between void/voidable contracts or between contracts that existed but are
excused and contacts that never existed is akin to the once-vigorous debate over the difference between conditions
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certain incongruity with the Court‟s stern declarations that it never holds people to arbitration
agreements to which they did not assent.121
The apotheosis of the separation of arbitration jurisprudence from contract law using
severability is 2010‟s Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson.122 An employee-at-will signed an
employment application containing nothing but an agreement to arbitrate disputes and related
rules, including a meta-clause directing that arbitration would resolve whether that agreement to
arbitrate was valid. The employee sued for unlawful discrimination and alleged that the
agreement was unconscionable because its arbitration rules were obnoxious.
Justice Scalia took the familiar formula, starting with incantations: arbitration is a matter
of contract, the FAA puts arbitration clauses on an equal footing with other contracts, courts
must enforce arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms, and they are, like other
contracts, subject to defenses such as fraud, duress or unconscionability.123 The rhetoric restated,
the Court applied federal arbitration jurisprudence, not contract law, and severed the clause. In a
rare show of candor, however, the Court acknowledged that the source of its rule is federal
arbitration jurisprudence.124 Despite that acknowledgement, the Court insisted that its holding
“merely reflects the principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”125
D. Dealing with Silence by Federal Judicial Fiat
Contractual silence is a vexing problem in the common law that has at least twice
bedeviled the Supreme Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence as well. In 2003‟s Green Tree Financial
precedent and conditions subsequent—which turns out to have no substantive significance but importance in legal
procedure. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 67, at § 8.2 (noting the classic case of Gray v. Gardner, 17
Mass. 188 (1821)).
121

E.g., Volt, 489 U.S. 468; First Options, 514 U.S. 938; Howsam, 537 U.S. 79.
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Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
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Id. (citing or quoting Buckeye, 546 U.S. 440; Volt, 514 U.S. 938; and Doctor’s Associates, 517 U.S. 681).
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Rent-A-Center, ___ U.S. ___ (“The severability rule is a „matter of substantive federal arbitration law,‟ and we
have repeatedly “rejected the view that the question of „severability‟ was one of state law, so that if state law held
the arbitration provision not to be severable a challenge to the contract as a whole would be decided by the court.”)
(quoting Buckeye, 546 U.S. 440; citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395; Southland, 465 U.S. 1; and Allied-Bruce, 513
U.S. 265). The cited authorities are far from clear that the law being applied is a special federal arbitration law—
they read as though they are applying contract law.
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Rent-A-Center, ___ U.S. ___ (citing First Options, 514 U.S. 938, 943; Howsam 537 U.S. 79l; and other Court
rhetoric). The Court also offered a statutory defense of its severability rule: the statute speaks of “a written
provision” to arbitrate rather than to the “contract” or “agreement” in which such a written provision appears. For
the Court, that justifies remitting challenges to the “contract” to arbitration and limiting judicial review to the
“provision.” Though it may seem hyper-technical, the Court‟s textual reading may not be intense enough. The
referenced FAA section talks about a “written provision” but the FAA‟s ensuing savings clause talks about grounds
applicable to “any contract.” That contrast between a “provision” and a “contract” is jarring and inexplicable taken
literally. The more natural reading is to equate “provision” with “contract” so that the “contract” is just as valid as
any other “contract.” It‟s not technically possible for a “provision” to be as valid as “any contract.”
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Corp. v. Bazzle,126 Justice Breyer‟s opinion returned to the issue of “who decides” and what
“clear and unmistakable” intent means. An arbitration clause was silent about whether arbitration
might take the form of class arbitration. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that its contract
law takes such silence to permit class arbitration. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed because the
state court wrongly thought that question was for the judiciary when, as a matter of federal
arbitration jurisprudence, particularly Howsam, it was for the arbitrator (the Court finding “clear
and unmistakable” party intention).127
Bazzle confused people (as much of the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence does). That
confusion manifested in a 2010 Court opinion chastising arbitrators for being confused and
rebuking them for allegedly not following the law. Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds128 involved
a commercial shipping contract with a standard arbitration clause. A customer wanted to use
class arbitration to air allegations that the shipping company illegally fixed prices for many
years. The two agreed that their contract did not say one way or the other whether class
arbitration was authorized. So they asked arbitrators to rule on the meaning of that silence. The
arbitrators held a hearing, took testimony, and researched the law and industry practice. Their
written report concluded that the clause authorized class arbitration, citing the clause, custom in
the shipping industry and general arbitration practice plus contract law precedents from New
York and elsewhere. The shipping company objected and sued to have that ruling vacated.
The Court vacated the award,129 accusing the arbitrators of exceeding their power under
the FAA.130 The Court recited the full litany of its incantations—nearly every specimen of
126

539 U.S. 444 (2003).

127

Chief Justice Rehnquist‟s dissent contended the case was controlled by First Options, not Howsam, making the
decision one for courts, not arbitrators (not seeing the requisite “clear and unmistakable” intent). He thought the case
easy for a judge to decide and that silence has but one meaning: the contract did not authorize class arbitration, so no
class arbitration could be ordered. Rehnquist followed the standard script: (a) lead with rhetoric that contract law
governs arbitration clauses, ordinarily a state law question, the goal being merely to put such clauses “upon the same
footing as other contracts,” and requiring the Court to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate” to effectuate
contract rights and party expectations; (b) follow that with the qualification that state law is preempted when it
conflicts with federal law; and (c) conclude by announcing that federal law interpretation requires a certain result
(here, that the clause cannot possibly authorize class arbitration). Scholars have been generous about Rehnquist‟s
dissent. Professor Huber called it “puzzling,” noting: “His approach, if adopted, would amount to nothing less than a
federal common law of arbitration contract interpretation.” Stephen K. Huber, Confusion About Class Arbitration, 7
J. TEX. CONSUMER L. 2, 6 (2003). That is an accurate description of Rehnquist‟s dissent—and of much of the rest of
the Court‟s federal arbitration jurisprudence. Moreover, as discussed in the ensuing text, the Court did adopt it in the
next big case, Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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The Court heard the case even though the FAA limits appellate review to arbitration “awards” and this was a
mere preliminary ruling at an early stage of the process. Justice Ginsburg‟s dissenting opinion stressed this
objection. Stolt-Neilsen, ___ U.S. at ___ (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10).
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Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA authorizes federal courts to vacate awards when arbitrators exceed their powers. 9
U.S.C. §10(a)(4). It likewise authorizes vacatur for awards procured by corruption, fraud or undue means or when
arbitrators evidence partiality or misconduct. . 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(1)-(3). Courts do not routinely invoke any such
grounds, and the excess powers ground is extremely rarely used.
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contract rhetoric the Court has used to characterize its arbitration jurisprudence since 1983:
arbitration clause interpretation is a matter of state contract law;131 arbitration is a matter of
consent, not coercion;132 the FAA‟s purpose is to make arbitration clauses enforceable according
to their terms;133 arbitrators derive power from contract;134 and arbitration procedures can be
freely designed because arbitration is a consensual matter.135 Justice Alito then wrote that it is
“clear from our precedents and the contractual nature of arbitration that courts and arbitrators
give effect to these contractual limitations [and we] must not lose sight of the purpose of the
exercise: to give effect to the intent of the parties.”136
Despite saying all of that, the Court never showed how a contract law analysis would
apply to the case or yield a result different from what the arbitrators reached under New York
contract law. Instead, after acknowledging that sometimes it is appropriate to supply missing
terms to agreements otherwise sufficiently definite to be binding,137 it simply declared that the
difference between “arbitration” and “class arbitration” is too vast to imply such a term.138 This
is not a statement of contract law, of course, but of federal arbitration law opinion, for which the
Court cited no authority.139 The Court‟s thick and stirring rhetoric about its devotion to contract
131

Stolt-Neilsen, ___ U.S. at ___.

132

Id., ___ U.S. at ___ (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. 468).
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Stolt-Neilsen, ___ U.S. at ___ (citing Volt, 489 U.S. 468, 479; Mastrobuono 514 U.S. 52, 57, 58; Doctor's
Associates, 517 U.S. 681, 688).
134

Stolt-Neilsen, (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648-649 (1986);
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960)).
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Stolt-Neilsen, (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52; citing Volt, 489 U.S. 468; First Options, 514 U.S. 938, 943;
and EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)). Conspicuously, the Court failed to cite an opinion
from its prior term contradicting its hyperbole about how important contracts and contract law really are in the
Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence, Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009), discussed infra.
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Stolt-Nielsen, ___ U.S. at ___. Characteristic of its arbitration opinions, the Court spends paragraphs reciting all
these rhetorical antecedents, only to conclude that the point it is asserting about the contractual basis of arbitration is
obvious. Cf. Hamlet, Act III, scene 2 (“The [Court] doth protest too much, methinks.”).
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Stolt-Nielsen, ___ U.S. at ___ (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 (1979)).
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The Court asserted: “In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts
to realize benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and ability to choose
expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes. But the relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less
assured, giving reason to doubt the parties‟ mutual consent to resolve disputes through class-wide arbitration.”
Stolt-Nielsen, ___ U.S. at ___. The Court cited no authority for this assertion. Instead it draw an analogy to the idea
in First Options about how difficult it is to imagine people thinking ahead of time about arcane questions like who
decides whether a clause covers a dispute. See supra text accompanying notes 96-105.
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In dissent, Justice Ginsburg revealed that the arbitrators relied on contract law in their decision interpreting this
contract, including the case of Evans v. Famous Music Corp., 1 N.Y.3d 452 (2004). It defines the law of contract
interpretation to consist first of reading text to resolve a dispute or, if that does not enable resolving it, consulting
extrinsic evidence, including industry custom and practice, to find a reasonable interpretation. The case involved a
musical recording contract‟s royalties. It defined royalties as all actual receipts less expenses including taxes. The
company paid foreign taxes and received US tax credits under a complex formula that left the company with a net
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law makes its reliance on perceived differences between direct and class arbitration pale by
comparison.140
E. The Death of Contract and The Denial of Death
Under the common law of contracts, people are usually free to make bargains on any
terms they wish and have the terms enforced. That is the essence of freedom of contract.
Contract law‟s third party beneficiary doctrine recognizes that strangers may enforce contracts
only in narrow circumstances when parties to contracts manifested intention to grant them. That
exquisitely illustrates a corollary principle called freedom from contract. 141 The Court‟s
arbitration jurisprudence gives short shrift to both fundamental principles, though proclaiming
devotion to them.
In 2009‟s Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle,142 clients sued professional advisors after a
tax shelter the advisors fashioned was held illegal. Contracts between the clients and a
management firm had arbitration clauses, but the firm was bankrupt so it and its contracts were
out of the case. Still, the advisors invoked those contracts, to which they were not parties, to seek
a stay. Lower courts denied the stay given that the advisers were strangers to the contracts. The
Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Scalia.
It began with incantations—arbitration agreements are contracts that federal law puts on
equal footing with others and state law governing contracts generally applies to determine what
contracts are enforceable. It added that the FAA directs courts to stay litigation in the face of
arbitration clauses found binding under state law. The Court declared that the lower courts erred
in holding that strangers to contracts cannot obtain stays under arbitration clauses because, it
said, state law allows “a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through
„assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party
beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel.‟”143
advantage. The issue was whether the clause required sharing half that advantage with artists. The clause was
oblique—much as a clause requiring arbitration is oblique on whether that means solo or class arbitration. The court
referenced custom and industry practice to resolve the ambiguity (finding intention not to share tax advantage). That
is a strong precedent for resolving the dispute in Stolt-Neilsen, which the arbitrators relied upon, as the Court‟s
dissent stressed, though the Court majority did not cite the case.
140

The Court‟s holding in Stolt-Neilsen does not have much to do with the Court‟s national policy favoring
arbitration—except to favor a particular form of arbitration, one-on-one, not class. The Court takes the liberties it
seized under the mantle of the national policy to greater lengths, setting by fiat how to interpret the word
“arbitration” when used in private contracts. Most striking about the opinion in terms of the rhetoric-reality gap is
how the Court sternly rebuked arbitrators for failing to apply contract law while the Court then failed to follow
contract law itself. See supra text accompanying notes 128-140. All of that contrasts sharply with the Court‟s Volt
opinion, holding that the national policy does not favor any particular type of arbitration and deferring to state law.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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E.g., Speidel, supra note 26.
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Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).
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Id. (citing 21 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed.2001)).
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The Court did not explore how any of those theories could give the advisors rights
against the clients under the latter‟s agreements with the management firm. None of the listed
theories work. The only theory the advisors asserted was estoppel, the equitable doctrine
available to do justice when legal principles fail, but that was unlikely applicable on the facts.144
So the Court simply declared that third-party beneficiary law might be a ground and reversed on
that basis. But that was an even wilder stretch since there was no evidence that the clients
intended for the advisers to have rights under their contracts with the management firm.145
Although state contract law on third party beneficiaries varies slightly from state to state, all at
minimum require the third party to prove that the contract parties intended them to have rights.146
The Court‟s assertions that arbitration is a matter of contractual consent, not coercion, fall flat.147
The clearest declaration of the death of contract in federal arbitration jurisprudence is
2010‟s Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.148 The Court declared that parties are not
allowed by contract to supplement FAA grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards. The
FAA states grounds courts may invoke to vacate or modify an award, including fraud, arbitrator
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Examples of equitable estoppel in arbitration are when a party claims the rights under an agreement while trying
to escape its duties or when the issues for resolution are intertwined. E.g., J.A. Construction Mgmt. Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Amer., 659 F.2d 836 (7 th Cir. 1981); Thomson-CFA S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass‟n, 64
F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11 th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 869 (1994); see J. Douglas Uloth, Equitable Estoppel as a Basis for Compelling Non-Signatories to
Arbitrate: A Bridge Too Far?, 21 REV. LITIG. 593 (2002). Nothing of the sort appeared in Arthur Andersen.
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See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §11:8, at 11-10. (3d ed. 2003); compare Dealer Serv.
Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947-48 (11th Cir. 1999); Parker v. Center for Creative Leadership, 15 P.3d 297
(Col. App. 2000) (employer and service provider manifested intention to benefit employee under contract so that
employee‟s claim against provider asserting employer rights was subject to contract‟s arbitration clause). The idea
that two people can make a contract binding on a stranger is alien to the common law of contracts, though the Court
refers to the possibility numerous times without illustration or citation. Arthur Andersen, ___ U.S. ___, ___, ___.
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Compare Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997), overruled on other grounds
(Alabama law requires intention of the parties to benefit a stranger) with E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Rhone Poulenc
Fiber & Resin, 26 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Delaware law) (requiring not only intention to benefit but
either intention to make a gift or discharge a debt and for that point to be a material part of the exchange).
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Nor could the Court avoid that criticism by blaming the statute, as it tried to do when writing: “If a written
arbitration provision is made enforceable against (or for the benefit of) a third party under state contract law, the
statute‟s terms are fulfilled.” Arthur Andersen, ___ U.S. ___. Professors Stone and Bales put the point presciently in
their casebook without adverting directly to Arthur Andersen, wondering whether third party beneficiary status
should be determined by state contract law or special federal law congruent with federal preemption and liberal
federal arbitration policy. See STONE & BALES, ARBITRATION LAW, supra note at, 418. They ask if the federal
presumption favoring arbitration commands that states grant third party beneficiary status “whenever there is a
colorable claim” to that standing and then ask, poignantly, “If so, what happens to the bedrock principle that
arbitration is grounded in consent of the parties.” Id. The Arthur Andersen case, like the dozen others considered in
this Article, raise doubt about whether that “bedrock principle” is more rhetorical than real.
148

552 U.S. 576 (2008). See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2009) (“This decision constitutes arguably the most significant constraint on party autonomy in
arbitration that the Court has imposed.”).
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misconduct, or (as in Stolt-Neilsen) an arbitrator exceeding powers.149 The parties by contract in
Hall Street added that awards under the arbitration agreement they assented to would be subject
to judicial review for erroneous conclusions of law. The arbitrator drew such an erroneous
conclusion and the party it hurt sought judicial review. The Supreme Court refused to enforce
that contract, demolishing contractual freedom,150 despite forty years of proclaiming that its
arbitration jurisprudence rests on contract and is intended to enforce contracts. The Court‟s
latest work thus shows both the death of contract at its hands and its denial of that death.
II. EXPLAINING AND ASSESSING THE RHETORIC-REALITY GAP
The Supreme Court routinely says that the FAA and federal arbitration jurisprudence are
a matter of contract law.151 There is some truth to such assertions, particularly when referring to
the existence of a flicker of volition nodding toward arbitration for dispute resolution. But the
Court‟s rhetoric about contract and contract law is more exuberant than the reality that dislodges
contracts and contract law from their usual roles. And the problem is not limited to widelyreferenced contexts such as when consumers or employees sign adhesion contracts with
boilerplate arbitration clauses the Court nevertheless enforces.152 The Court likewise imposes its
national policy favoring arbitration on commercial parties in arms‟-length negotiations using
equally alluring rhetoric.153 Wonderment arises: what explains this gap and why might it matter?
A. Doctrinal Explanations
Scholars could defend the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence by reinterpreting it in
different ways, loosely classifiable as doctrinal. Doctrinal explanations might assert that: (1)
there is less difference than appears between rhetoric and reality or between any gap the Court
shows and gaps prevalent in other areas of law or the general law of contracts or (2) contract
law‟s default rule theory explains the Court‟s jurisprudence, including any perceived differences
149

9 U.S.C. § 10; see supra note 130 (summarizing grounds FAA authorizes courts to use to vacate awards).
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See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905 (2010)
(demonstrating insurmountable obstacles people face who wish to contract around the Court‟s holding in the case) .
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Scholars urge the point. E.g., Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is Not Enough: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 51 (1997) (“The central element of arbitration is the intention of the
parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement”); STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 20, 22-23 (2d ed. 2007).
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E.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (securities brokerage contract),
discussed supra text accompanying notes 79-89; Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (atwill employment agreement form), discussed supra text accompanying notes 122- 127.
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E.g., Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (commercial actors and trans-ocean shipping
contracts), discussed supra text accompanying notes 128-140;Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896
(2009) (business entrepreneurs and sophisticated professional advisors), discussed supra text accompanying notes
142-147; Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (commercial lease agreement between
sophisticated parties), discussed supra text accompanying notes 148-150.
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between what it says and what it does. However, neither retelling of the Court‟s arbitration
jurisprudence is compelling. Instead, the best doctrinal account is less an explanation than
another anomaly requiring explanation: the Court‟s rhetoric reflects 19th century classical
contract law while its applications evince a caricature of late 20th century post-realist contract
law that Grant Gilmore called “contorts” in his famously enigmatic book, The Death of Contract.
1. Rhetoric and Reality. The rhetoric-reality gap may simply reflect similar gaps that are
pervasive in law. Courts roundly intone one policy tradition of grand and enduring appeal, such
as tort law‟s “no duty to rescue,” then announce an exception, in a process that if repeated
enough yields the familiar result of the exception swallowing the rule. Episodes like that recur in
law. But they still tend to be special cases rather than routine. Rhetoric-reality gaps remain an
anomaly to highlight, explain or criticize—as this Article does—rather than the norm to be
expected. In the case of the Court‟s talk and action, it repeatedly asserts a singular rule—freedom
of contract—then often generates applications at odds with that.154 At that general level, the gap
is difficult to deny.
At a more particular level, it is possible to claim that a peculiarly vibrant rhetoric-reality
gap pervades contract law. Besides freedom of contract, judges routinely proclaim mantras in
contract law such as no punitive damages are awarded, mutuality is required, and party
autonomy is the standard. Yet some research studies show punitive damages are awarded in a
greater percentage of contracts cases than tort cases,155 case analysis shows that mutuality is
often lacking when binding contracts are found, and party autonomy has faded into the deep
background amid the past century‟s proliferation of standardized forms. To that extent, the
Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence may replicate national contract law jurisprudence.
But there are both qualitative and quantitative differences. The Court has fielded only a
handful of arbitration cases annually in the past two generations and the Justices do not rotate
very much. The same dozen people have written about a score of opinions. They can be expected
more readily to produce opinions coherent in rhetoric and reality than a welter of far-flung courts
in many jurisdictions facing a bewildering variety of fact patterns, contending equities, and
varying judicial staffing. Yet the small coterie of Justices has not produced such a coherent body
of opinions, leaving a gap more pronounced than appears elsewhere in the law of contracts.
On the other hand, a variation on this explanation might question whether the gap
portrayed in Part I is exaggerated because of contract law‟s breadth and capaciousness. After all,
contract law governs an infinite variety of deals. That often requires tailoring general doctrines to
particular contexts, such as for transactions in goods, land sales, construction contracts, or
consumer exchanges. The Court‟s adaptation of general contract law to the special context of
154

At the other extreme, skeptics may wonder if there can even be a gap between judicial rhetoric and reality. If the
Court starts by saying it is embracing the red principle and people detect in its application that it is in reality
applying the blue principle, is there a gap between the rhetoric of red and the reality of blue or is there a new relation
between talk and practice, in which red means blue. This is a farfetched stance and does not remotely capture the
relation between the Court saying such things as “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion,” and ordering a
client to arbitrate with professional advisors thought it never agreed with them to do that.
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See Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of Punitive Damages, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 1.
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arbitration may simply advance a grand tradition, still being about freedom of contract,
warranting the rhetoric, with applications that differ slightly from applications in other contexts.
Some of the Court‟s rules may be explained in these terms, particularly its rules to interpret
ambiguous expressions—construing doubtful clauses to favor arbitration though insisting on
clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to have arbitrators decide threshold questions.156
But many Court arbitration law doctrines depart so considerably from general contract
law that they achieve a different purpose—one in the service of social control, not freedom of
contract. Examples are the holding in Allied-Bruce announcing federal rules declaring which
contracts are within the FAA‟s scope,157 expanding the enforcement rights of strangers to
contracts under Arthur Andersen,158 and denying party autonomy to contract for judicial review
of arbitration awards as stated in Hall Street.159 The rules more clearly advance the purpose of a
national policy committed to arbitration than a national policy committed to freedom of
contract—while denying doing that—as evidenced in the Court‟s approach to choice of law
clauses in such cases as Mastrobuono160 and its severability rule stated in cases such as Prima
Paint, Buckeye and Rent-A-Center.161 Thus there remains something unusual about the rhetoricreality gap in the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence requiring further explanation.
2. Default Rule Theory. Another doctrinal explanation for the Court‟s jurisprudence, and
its gap between rhetoric and reality, reinterprets the jurisprudence in terms of default rule theory
in contract law. This framework appreciates that no contract can be perfectly complete given
transaction costs and limitations of human foresight. One function of contract law is to provide
rules that apply when a contract does not address an issue or that apply no matter what, courtesy
of public policy. Most contract law default rules can be changed (such as risk of loss to goods in
transit or the destruction of a contract‟s subject matter); the few that cannot (such as the
compensation principle or the statute of frauds) exhibit a strong and readily identifiable rationale
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Compare Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 69-76, with First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), supra text
accompanying notes 96-105.
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See Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 90-95.
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See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009), discussed supra text accompanying notes 142-147.
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See Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), discussed supra text accompanying notes
148- 150.
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See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 79-89.
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See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), discussed supra text accompanying notes
118-121; Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), discussed supra text accompanying notes
122-127.
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consistent with fundamental principles of contract law and accompanied by ameliorating
doctrines to avoid harsh results in particular cases.162
The strongest examples supporting the default rule explanation of the Court‟s
jurisprudence are the Court‟s express statements of this approach in cases such as Howsam and
First Options. They are explicit in using hypothetical bargain analysis and saying the Court‟s
goal is to “align probable expectations with the understood comparative expertise of institutional
arbitrators in interpreting their own rules.”163 But, aside from being rare for that feature, the talk
remains more rhetorical rather than real, and the rest of the Court‟s arbitration rules tend to be
statements of judicial fiat in the name of the national policy favoring arbitration, without regard
to presumed or probable party intent.
Exquisitely, Allied-Bruce denies that party contemplations matter when determining
whether the Court‟s national policy or state law should govern, favoring a determination based
on what the Court declares to involve interstate commerce.164 Another strong example negating
the default rule explanation is the Court‟s express denial of this approach in Hall Street. The
Court refused to recognize as enforceable a contract clause contemplating judicial review of an
agreed arbitration award for errors of law.165 This denial of freedom of contract illustrates how
default rule theory simply crumbles as an explanation of the Court‟s jurisprudence and its
rhetoric-reality gap.166
It is also difficult to explain cases such as Mastrobuono in terms of default rule theory.
That case denied effect to a New York choice of law clause when the Court found that state‟s
laws about arbitrators‟ powers unappealing. Portraying this as a matter of default rule theory
might begin by asserting that choice of law clauses choose only among state laws, not between
state and federal law, since both the latter are sovereign in the states. But if the Court has
produced an appealing contribution to the law governing arbitration, authentically about contract
law, then it has also created a choice between co-equal governing laws, such as New York versus
Federal. Yet cases such as Mastrobuono do not promote free party choice over whether a

162

For example, exceptions from the nominally immutable statute of frauds default rule include the part
performance doctrine and, in some states, promissory estoppel; exceptions from the nominally immutable default
rule against stipulated remedies that impose penalties for breach is the alternative performance doctrine.
163

See supra text accompanying notes 96-109 (noting Justice Breyer‟s attempts to defend some of the Court‟s
jurisprudence using contract law default rule theory).
164

Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 90-95.
165

Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), discussed supra text accompanying notes
148-150.
166

Some language toward the end of the Hall Street opinion obliquely suggests some possibility of altering the
Court‟s rule by reference to general principles of state law discussed in Volt, but that escape route is not explicated
and not highly reliable.

27

particular state‟s law or the Court‟s FAA law should govern. That is not exactly consistent with
default rule theory.167
Arthur Andersen cannot be squared with default rule theory. It expands the Court‟s
presumption favoring arbitration by finding that parties who signal will to arbitrate anything,
agree to arbitrate everything. Conceiving of the case in default rule terms, Professor Rau
suggests this analogy: if you expressly agree to arbitrate about the sale of fruit, then you
implicitly agree to arbitrate about whether the sale of tomato is a sale of fruit. 168 The analogy
may be persuasive in principle, but does not justify Arthur Andersen.
The question in Arthur Andersen was whether a party can be compelled to arbitrate an
issue, not against a party it made that agreement with, but against a party with whom it made no
such agreement. That is not analogous to the fruit-tomato example. Indeed, in compelling that
arbitration, the Court distinguished its rhetoric suggesting it does not compel people to arbitrate
issues they did not agree to arbitrate. The result is greater reluctance to compel arbitration about
classifying tomatoes under an agreement to arbitrate about fruit and greater willingness to
compel arbitration against a stranger to a contract so long as that contract had an arbitration
clause.169
Even if the default rule theory of the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence retains some
purchase, another weakness in that conception is how many of the Court‟s default rules tend to
be sticky. True, if classified as default rules, some are easy to contract around, such as avoiding
ambiguity or using an adjective to modify the word arbitration if intending to authorize particular
forms of arbitration, such as class arbitration. But try to choose a law other than the FAA or try
to make clear that no third parties can enforce an arbitration clause.
The logic if not the language of the Court‟s opinions indicate a stickiness not common in
general contract law default rules. As a contrast, consider such routine subjects as the default rule
setting a reasonable time, which may be contracted around simply by stating dates and times.
The Court‟s arbitration default rules, as a class, are more akin to warranty law that can only be
167
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disclaimed by following particular procedures, especially using unambiguous and specific
language.170 These rules are more familiar in the law of torts than they are in the law of contracts,
inviting a final doctrinal view of the Court‟s jurisprudence better classified as contorts than
contracts.
3. Contorts. A final way to classify the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence is: classical in
rhetoric, but post-realist in application. The Court reflects two contending strands of contract
law, one exuberantly and classically about autonomy, the other consciously and modernly
injecting a role for society in contracting and contract law. Contract law is rooted deeply in party
autonomy and freedom and was historically unshackled by status-based impositions that
distinguish contract from tort law. That deep root and vital distinction loom large in the Court‟s
rhetoric about arbitration jurisprudence. Another view of contracts recognizes its distinction from
tort as far more blurry and its roots in party autonomy often overstated. That view of contracts
was charmingly dubbed contorts by Grant Gilmore in his controversial caricature of modern
contract law The Death of Contract.171 It is more congruent with the Court‟s real applications in
its arbitration jurisprudence, rhetoric aside.
In this interpretation, autonomy is not so much an exercise of preference given the
contexts and purposes of people, but an interpretation of action limited by the context and
purpose of the rules. It is not merely heeding old-fashioned principles in the common law of
contracts. The Court is not applying the common law of contracts, but a special brand of contract
law it has developed for arbitration in light of its declared national policy favoring arbitration. It
is a national policy that supersedes values embedded in the common law of contracts (volition,
autonomy, freedom of and from contract). There is thus a gap between the Court‟s rhetoric (all
about those venerable values) and the reality (heavily influenced by a superseding national
policy), which remains to be explained.
B. Legalistic Accounts
A likely explanation for the rhetoric-reality gap is how it is a tool to cover an inherent
conflict in the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence. The Court insists that there is a national policy
favoring arbitration over litigation. That entails a policy disfavoring trial by jury as guaranteed
by the Constitution along with other procedural due process.172 To validate that national policy
requires respecting such constitutional rights and associated traditions. It demands some
voluntary basis to direct people to arbitration instead of the courthouse. That means contracts.173
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But if parties have true freedom of contract, they could interfere with that national policy. People
could freely agree to levels of judicial review over arbitration awards,174 be free from strangers
asserting mandates to arbitrate disputes,175 and easily escape the clutches of federal law in favor
of state law.176 Allowing such a full range of contractual freedom would prevent the possibility
of maintaining a national policy favoring arbitration. The tension thus induces rhetoric about
contracts.
Similarly, when insisting on a national policy favoring arbitration, the Justices know that
entails the federalization of an area of law traditionally reposed in the states. Such a move defies
federalism. States‟ rights are thus at stake in the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence. That is true for
all Justices, whatever their usual view on the relative powers of federal and state government. To
promote the respectability of an assertion of national policy, it helps to maintain its links to state
law prerogatives. That means contract law. But, again, too much deference to state law would
undermine a national policy. That tension induces rhetoric about state contract law. It is therefore
easy to understand why the Court would embrace the rhetoric of contracts and of contract law
while advancing its national policy favoring arbitration.
On the other hand, maneuvering to secure legitimacy under constitutionally-pedigreed
access to justice or federalism impulses does not require a rhetoric-reality gap as wide as the
cases reveal. Finding requisite citizen volition to warrant re-channeling disputes from litigation
to arbitration can be done within a federal arbitration regime expressly unmoored from contract
law. Gestures towards federalism could be made by showing such linkages between the Court‟s
jurisprudence and state law that do exist without rhetorical exaggeration. Certainly, the rhetoricreality gap as to contract law does not cure the federalism objection, and the rhetoric about
fidelity to contracts is not a perfect disguise for the coercive aspects of the jurisprudence.
An additional explanation for the rhetoric-reality gap is the statutory basis of the Court‟s
jurisprudence. The FAA was motivated by judicial reluctance to enforce contracts. The text of
the statute speaks of contracts. The Court‟s talk of anchoring its application of the statute in
contract law thus makes obvious sense. But it does not explain why the Court fashioned a
separate federal arbitration law, distinct from the common law of contracts, and certainly does
not explain the rhetoric-reality gap. The choice to develop a different body of law is explicable,
ultimately and simply, by the Court‟s determination that there should be a national policy
favoring arbitration. Once that policy was declared, a new set of tools, not merely those found in
general contract law, was necessary to implement it. The rhetoric compensates for the need to be
faithful not only to the statute—and the Constitution and federalism—but to the Court‟s
determination of the national policy it expresses.
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This legalistic account, thus combining constitutional, legislative, and policy impulses,
provides a plausible explanation for the rhetoric-reality gap. Even so, it cannot be claimed as
definitive. After all, it suggests that the Justices consciously cultivate the rhetoric-reality gap. But
evidence is scarce to support such disingenuous calculation. So the legalistic accounts are
probably incomplete and further explanation warranted.
C. Institutional Stories
A credible institutional explanation for the rhetoric-reality gap is lack of interest among
the Justices in subtleties that grappling with contract law in the arbitration context requires. One
version of this explanation suggests that the Court may think it is enforcing contracts according
to the common law of contracts, supplemented with federal rules that are contractual too. The
Justices occasionally cite contract law authority.177
In clear cases of departures, especially with its severability rule, the Court stresses
forthrightly that it is developing and applying substantive arbitration law based on the FAA. 178 In
others, such as the Court‟s presumptions concerning the question of “who decides” whether an
issue is subject to arbitration, it even uses the tools of hypothetical bargain to struggle with
contract law terrain.179 But those citations, admissions, and struggles are sparse and most of the
Court‟s citations in its arbitration opinions are to its own previous opinions, not to material on
the common law of contracts or state contract law.
Another version of this explanation is more fundamental—that the Court is not equipped
to attend to the required subtleties of the common law of contracts. There is a good deal of
evidence to support this take. The Court has historically acknowledged its comparative
disadvantage in matters of the common law, including contracts, which can vary among the
states.180 The Court has few occasions to immerse the Justices in the common law of contracts,
since it is rarely the court of last resort to address contract law issues.181
That contrasts with the Court‟s routine and deep engagement in the fields that form most
of its docket, such as constitutional law, federal courts, administrative law, and statutory and
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regulatory interpretation. Leading students of the Court‟s arbitration jurisprudence detect a
comparative lack of serious interest in the subject.182 If true, it would not be surprising that the
Court would slight contract law aspects of these cases.
The Court receives plenty of briefs and could read the substantial literature about all
aspects of the issues. But lawyers and scholars involved likewise have not stressed the rhetoricreality gap nor given the Court reason to redress it. Much of the Court‟s jurisprudence, as with
the literature, uses vocabulary unique to arbitration cases. It is not only alien to the common law
of contracts but sometimes suggests a subordination of contract and contract law to arbitration
and national policy.
A pervasive, though modest, example of the subordination rhetoric is how the Court
refers to contract law as providing “background principles.” Though that phrase is commonly
used among contract law scholars to designate default rules that parties can tailor in particular
settings,183 the Court‟s use suggests those are subordinate to what it declares to be the principles
of federal arbitration law.184
The most cynical explanation for the rhetoric-reality gap is how the judiciary is a primary
beneficiary of the Court‟s discernment of a national policy favoring arbitration.185 Federal
judges, especially Justices of the Supreme Court, may be uncomfortable as primary marketers of
such a national policy. It could feel better to wrap the product and pitch in slogans of contract
and contractual freedom—while exercising the powerful leverage of federal law to guarantee the
182
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product‟s marketing success.186 Though cynical, there is some purchase in this account, at least
as a partial explanation.187
Finally, it is difficult to attribute the rhetoric-reality gap to ideology, since all the Justices
contribute to the gap. Indeed, scholars stress that the Justices share the perception of a national
policy favoring arbitration and the resulting pro-arbitration bias pulsing through its
jurisprudence.188 In early cases developing this national policy, in the 1980s, there was clear
divergence on ideological grounds between the Justices as to federalism—a majority willing to
sally forth into state territory while a conservative minority resisted on federalism grounds—
notably O‟Connor and Rehnquist in the 1980s and Scalia and Thomas later.189 Yet that initial
rallying charge was led by another conservative, Burger, and gradually all but Thomas
capitulated to federalization.190 That said, opinions by Justices Thomas and Rehnquist, concerned
with federalism, exhibit the narrowest gap between the rhetoric of contracts and contract law and
the reality.191
Though ideology does not explain the rhetoric-reality gap, it does influence its shape.
Justice Brennan, liberal lion, wrote the Court‟s most forceful assertions of federal pro-arbitration
policy in Moses Cone.192 Then-Justice Rehnquist, a conservative, objected to Brennan‟s opinion:
“In its zeal to provide arbitration for a party it thinks deserving, the Court has made an exception
to established rules of procedure”193—not an objection to FAA jurisprudence, but an
acknowledgement of zealotry‟s role in protecting a favored class of party. Likewise, Rehnquist,
devotee of federalism, deferred to state law in Volt194 while Justice Stevens, a liberal less moved
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by states‟ rights, withheld deference in Mastrobuono on analytically-identical facts.195 Stevens
empathized with consumers, including securities brokerage customers, and leaned over
backwards in Mastrobuono to allow them an award of punitive damages. Justice Thomas, diehard conservative, dissented. But the majority opinions in Volt and Mastrobuono stated the
standard contract rhetoric and then applied federal arbitration jurisprudence discordantly.
Justice Breyer wrote the Court‟s principal opinions on the clarity of threshold intent
about “who decides.”196 The opinions suggest a moderate judge offering a nuanced and cautious
approach, finding some room for judicial oversight of the arbitration process. They commanded
wide assent among the Justices.197 In contrast, Justice Scalia wrote the Court‟s recent opinions
on the severability doctrine.198 The opinions reflect a conservative judge taking a formal
approach strongly committed to the arbitrator‟s power. They prompted dissents by liberal
Justices like Stevens more willing to use policing tools such as unconscionability.
But all these opinions—by Breyer, Scalia and Stevens—first venerated contract law and
then applied arbitration jurisprudence in ways at odds with it. In addition, Justice Alito, a
conservative, strained himself in Stolt-Neilsen to prevent class actions against businesses199 over
the liberal Justice Ginsburg‟s dissent calling the majority out for benefiting big business on terms
that may not apply to help consumers. But, again, the opinions of both Justices make the same
points about contractual freedom and contract law and then bury that in conflicting federal
arbitration jurisprudence.
Ideology simply vanishes in many cases where Justices have disagreements. Justice
Scalia‟s majority opinion in Arthur Andersen, taking an expansive view of third party beneficiary
law, prompted a dissent joined by the liberal Stevens, the conservative Roberts, and the moderate
Souter.200 But the opinions showed pretty much the same rhetoric-reality gap, both first
championing the contractual nature of arbitration only to state and apply contract law principles
more loosely than the common law of contracts would. Similarly, Justice Souter‟s majority
opinion in Hall Street, denying contractual freedom to expand judicial review of arbitration
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awards, prompted a dissent joined by the liberal Stevens, the conservative Kennedy and the
moderate Breyer.201
So there is little doubt that ideology plays a role in how the Justices approach federal
arbitration jurisprudence and how they perceive, describe and apply contract law principles. But
the rhetoric-reality gap transcends the ideological spectrum, making this at best a partial
explanation for the character of the gap. Nor is it the case that the Justices are faithful to or
disagree about a particular theory of contract law or school of contract law thought—such as
classical, formalist, realist, anti-formalist, neo-formalist, or anything else.202 Far from struggling
to classify contract law into such categories, the Court elides them, sallying forth to state and
apply versions of contract law that suit its national policy favoring arbitration.203
Finally, the persistence and widening of the rhetoric-reality gap is likely also due to how
there is no higher court that can correct the Court, even in matters outside its bailiwick, such as
contract law. The story helps to underscore the beauty of the common law as a system. It seems
highly unlikely that a group of nine judges sitting on high, and hearing a handful of cases
annually over a few decades, will produce law as appealing as that produced in contract law over
centuries by up to 50 state supreme courts plus England‟s high courts over tens of thousands of
cases.
D. Costs
Scholarly debate concerning federal arbitration jurisprudence is dominated by
disagreement about the comparative efficacy of arbitration compared to litigation.204 What‟s at
stake is the fairness and efficiency of the process. By studying federal arbitration jurisprudence
from the perspective of contract rhetoric versus reality, a different set of problems appears. These
concern the effects of a federal jurisprudence that is often wrong and misleading about contracts
and contract law. The rhetoric-reality gap produces abstract costs of illegitimacy; defiance or
distortion; incoherence; and misperception.
Any gap between what judges or other public officials do and what they say creates risk
to the legitimacy of the official and the official‟s actions.205 The rhetoric-reality gap in federal
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arbitration jurisprudence exposes several problems. The talk of freedom of contact obscures how
the primary engine of this jurisprudence is the Court‟s discernment of a national policy favoring
arbitration. That has nothing to do with freedom of contract or the exquisitely apolitical body of
contact law,206 but everything to do with judicial power and institutional prerogatives.207 It is also
by definition a national rather than state policy; the talk of deference to state contract law as a
gesture to federalism not only makes the assertion hypocritical but unfairly mutes valid
federalism objections to the Court‟s usurpation of the field.208
A related risk of perceived illegitimacy is how the Court‟s pronouncements may provoke
state defiance.209 The Supreme Court faces rebuke from state courts, which thumb their noses at
the Court210 or state legislatures, which sometimes leave on the books statutes that would be
illegal under its precedents.211 Obviously, such state objections to federal invasion may exist
even if the Court‟s rhetoric were faithful to its applications. But it seems likely that the gap
between rhetoric and reality fortifies state objections; it invites states to explain why, under
contract law as state officials know it, unlike how the Supreme Court develops it, the state is
correct and the Court wrong.212 State officials may have a duty to resist usurpations of
constitutionally-protected state prerogatives, including those that federal law under the FAA
purports to preempt.213
On the other hand, some states simply knuckle under, declaring the Court‟s opinions the
law of the land and withdrawing contrary state opinions after being rebuked.214 Though not all
states defy the federal regime, those following it often cause the problem of distortion. Before
Prima Paint,215 most state courts held that defenses asserting fraud in the inducement were for
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courts to decide, not arbitrators.216 Among these was New York, leader in contract law, including
in arbitration cases.217 The grounds were straightforward principles of contract law: the
arbitration clause was not severable from the principal contract. Similar results and reasoning
appeared elsewhere.218 Prima Paint led New York to switch and follow the federal rule.219 The
grounds were a more adventuresome principle of arbitration policy: following contract law
“defeats . . . two of arbitration‟s primary virtues, speed and finality . . . .”220
The Court‟s jurisprudence has prompted the distortion of state law in other states too,
including California.221 Its high court likewise construed the California arbitration statute to
distinguish sharply between arbitration clauses and the broader contracts of which they usually
are part. Its rationale was the same, putting arbitration policy above freedom of contract.
Dissenting, Justice Mosk declared that approach to put the cart before the horse, showing
“resupination: logic and procedure turned upside down.”222
Mosk was more persuaded by the “irrefutable dissent” in Prima Paint and the few state
courts that held out against the sweep of the federal rule, including Montana and Louisiana.223
Mosk stressed that, if arbitration is really a matter of contract, then courts must take seriously,
and not merely rhetorically, basic principles, including that “one of the essential elements of a
contract [is] that the parties enter into it knowingly and consensually, not through fraud, duress,
menace, undue influence, or mistake.”224
The gap and challenges to jurisprudential legitimacy pose additional practical problems
of doctrinal incoherence, both within federal jurisprudence and collaterally on the law of
contracts. The Court‟s jurisprudence is often confusing, especially concerning questions such as
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“who decides”225 and what “clear and unmistakable” means.226 The confusion is likely at least a
partial product of assertions that contract and contract law dominate with applications showing
that a national federal policy favoring arbitration dominates. Indeed, the concept of “clear and
unmistakable” simply does not appear as an interpretive principle or presumption anywhere in
the law of contracts.227 Worse, other courts are nevertheless tempted by the Supreme Court‟s
lead to adapt statements of presumptions about contractual intent from the arbitration context to
the general context of contracts.228
A cumulative variation of all these problems is the problem of misperception. The
Court‟s rhetoric, taken literally, gives contract law a bad name. For example, Professor Linda
Mullenix wrote: “the supremacy of contract law over long-established jurisdictional doctrines
has significantly eroded certain fundamental litigation rights.”229 This lays the blame for
infirmities in the Court‟s jurisprudence on contract law. But it is not the “supremacy of contract
law” that is responsible for any such infirmities that may exist. It is the rhetorical invocation of
notions of contracts while really using a different batch of arbitration jurisprudence.
A final particular problem arising from lack of coherence in the jurisprudence is how it
impairs the Court‟s primary job under which the FAA, which is determining whether inferior
courts apply contract law consistent with the statute. This problem was evident in the 2010-11
term‟s prominent case, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. The issue was whether California
unconscionability law applies to “any contract,” within the meaning of the FAA as the Court
construes it.
The case involved a form contract where a consumer claimed a fraud of $30 and sought
to wage a class arbitration—which a contract clause barred. California precedents classify as
unconscionable procedurally-adhesive clauses that can be used to prevent people from banding
together to challenge crooked practices that involve stealing small sums from large numbers of
people.230

225

See, e.g., Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), discussed supra text accompanying notes
126-127.
226

See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 96-105; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002), discussed supra text accompanying notes
106-113.
227

See supra note 104.

228

For instance, there is no general principle of contract law directing construing ambiguous clauses in favor of
arbitration, yet courts have enlarged the Court‟s version of that statement to portray it as a general principle of
contract law. E.g., Collins v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1473 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
229

Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 291, 296-97 (1988).
230

E.g., Fensterstock v. Education Finance Partners, 611 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (reviewing and applying California
law of unconscionability doctrine to arbitration clause in consumer finance contract).

38

The case showed how the Court‟s rhetoric is at war with itself: rhetoric from pure
nineteenth century freedom of contract suggests upholding the bar because the clause is in the
written agreement; rhetoric about state contract law suggests striking the bar because the written
agreement is invalid. The Court‟s challenge was to state a test of preemption: how to tell if a
state‟s judges comply with the FAA‟s mandate to treat arbitration clauses like other contracts?
The company said it was simple: look at general unconscionability doctrine applied to all
contracts and compare it to unconscionability doctrine applied to arbitration clauses.231 Taking
the FAA literally, the company argued that the comparison must be between the
unconscionability doctrine applied to arbitration clauses and general unconscionability doctrine
applicable to “any contract”—not just other dispute resolution clauses.
This approach reflects how the Court‟s jurisprudence induces thinking about the question.
Under that jurisprudence, moreover, it is difficult to escape concluding that the doctrine does not
apply to “any contract.” It applies to a species of contracts that enable cheating small sums from
large numbers of people. But preempting the law and upholding the statute on such grounds
would be a strange result. Such a stance suggests that contract law is monolithic and static when
in reality it is rich and dynamic. The result would make concrete some of the abstract costs noted
earlier, such as illegitimacy and defiance.232
Beyond rhetoric, it‟s not obvious how the Court‟s national policy favoring arbitration
applies. Simply to favor arbitration does not necessarily answer whether a clause banning class
arbitration promotes or retards that policy. But a national policy favoring a particular kind of
arbitration—the swift and cheap bilateral form, not the lengthy and costly class form—clearly
calls for reversing the lower courts, preempting state contract law that holds such bans
unconscionable.
The Court would have done well to find a more practical and legitimate approach to
assessing the validity of state law under the FAA. It would have been best to abandon the
rhetoric and instead embrace contracts, contract law, and federalism. The first principle would be
federal deference to state courts and state contract law. That could be subject to qualifying
principles to catch subterfuge based on an objective determination about a state‟s faithfulness to
the FAA. States would be freer to develop contract law for application across settings, including
to contracts with arbitration clauses.
Citizens could rely on venerable principles of freedom of contract (and freedom from
contract) developed in the common law rather than the truncated versions of those doctrines
231
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applied underneath the Court‟s rhetoric. Alas, the Court‟s jurisprudence did not equip it to reach
such a result, which would require retreating significantly from its exuberance for the national
policy favoring arbitration. Instead, the Court followed its usual course, offering an opinion rich
with empty rhetoric about arbitration being a creature of contract while being more explicit than
ever that what matters in these cases is the Court‟s powerful national policy strongly favoring a
particular form of arbitration over other ways to resolve disputes.
The Court could not accept the validity of the California unconscionability defense,
however, because it did not advance the national policy. Justice Scalia gave a new definition of
that national policy, again combining two ideas that are in conflict while pretending they are in
harmony: “to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms, so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.” The opinion fights tirelessly but unsuccessfully to prove that
it has not made up this new version of the national policy. It struggles strenuously but
unsuccessfully to persuade that there is no conflict between its devotion to arbitration and basic
principles of Anglo-American contract law.
The opinion gestures about how carefully crafted the contract law it finds preempted to
be, but without appreciating contract law aspects of the stance. Instead, the Court commits
contradictions that manifest a lack of understanding of contract law and even life. Most
strikingly: on one page Justice Scalia observes that consumer contracts are totally “adhesive”
today yet on the very next page strikes the California law because the aggregate actions it ordains
are not “consensual.” The passages are oblivious to how difficult it is to conceive of an adhesion
contract as consensual. There may be ways to reconcile these propositions, but it would require
much more honest confrontation with the fact that it is the national policy favoring arbitration
alone that is driving things, not contract, not freedom, and not volition.
Nor did Justice Breyer‟s dissenting opinion address or appreciate the gap between what
the Court says and does about contracts in its arbitration jurisprudence. It instead fights the
majority on the purpose of the statute concerning arbitration as a national policy, the differences
between arbitration and litigation, and the differences between bilateral and aggregate
arbitration. Only Justice Thomas, as usual, offered any serious effort to engage in contract law
discussion and analysis. He struggled to map the statute onto the law of contracts. He took the
statutory text literally, though, treating the word “revocation” in its savings clause to recognize
only those defenses to arbitration agreements that affect the making of a contract rather than its
enforceability or validity. This enabled him to concur. It is a far better ground than the majority
offered because it is faithful to contracts and contract law.
CONCLUSION
My initial motivation for writing this article was receipt in early 2010 of a reprint of an
Illinois Law Review article apparently sent to contract law teachers nationally, by noted
arbitration scholar Thomas Stipanowich.233 In a comprehensive review of the state of arbitration
law and practice, the piece criticized editors of Contracts casebooks for paying too little attention
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to arbitration and especially to how the attention given was often extremely negative.234 As a
Contracts law teacher for 20 years, the point resonated.235 With modest exceptions, contract law
books and courses have not generally treated arbitration much and the treatment often is in the
context of illustrating doctrines like unconscionability or lopsided terms not comporting with
reasonable expectations of a community. The piece stimulated my interest in arbitration.
I began following pending Supreme Court cases on the subject and scrutinizing those
handed down in preceding terms. I found the talk about contracts and contract law intriguing
because it made it sound as if arbitration was at the center of contract law and that contract law
was at the center of arbitration law. That made it seem irresponsible for me, Contracts casebook
editors, and other teachers, to leave arbitration at the margins of the Contracts course or outside it
altogether. Alas, the truth is that contract and contract law have so little to do with what happens
in arbitration jurisprudence, particularly compared to Court rhetoric, that it would confuse or
mislead students taking Contracts to provide it as an illustration. To that extent, arbitration thus
warrants the glancing treatment in the Contracts course, warranting treatment in a separate
course.236
Even so, Contracts teachers and students may wish to pay more concerted attention to
what the Court has been up to, since the rhetoric-reality gap should be of some concern to them.
Moreover, as pressure to close the gap builds, the Court may abandon its novel experiment with
a national policy favoring arbitration dressed in contract rhetoric and embrace the older national
policy favoring real freedom of contract. That would be of great interest to Contracts teachers
and students. In fact, that raises one normative implication of this Article worth stating explicitly:
the Court should either give up its national policy favoring arbitration and truly respect freedom
of contract or come clean about its national policy‟s real implications, and acknowledge its
embrace of a restricted conception of contract and contract law.
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